Abstract-Such high-wattage demand-side appliances as Plugin Electric Vehicles (PEVs) are proliferating. As a result, information on the charging patterns of PEVs is becoming accessible via smartphone applications, which aggregate real-time availability and historical usage of public PEV charging stations. Moreover, information on the power grid infrastructure and operations is available in white papers, technical documents, and realtime dashboards of the utilities, affiliates, and the power grid operators. The research question that this study explores is: Can one combine high-wattage demand-side appliances with public information to launch cyberattacks on the power grid? To answer this question and report a proof of concept demonstration, the study scrapes data from public sources for Manhattan, NY using the electric vehicle charging station smartphone application and the power grid data circulated by the US Energy Information Administration, New York Independent System Operator, and the local utility in New York City. It then designs a novel datadriven cyberattack strategy using state-feedback based partial eigenvalue relocation, which targets small-signal stability of the power grid. The study establishes that while such an attack is not possible at the current penetration level of PEVs, it will be practical once the number of PEVs increases.
I. INTRODUCTION
P OWER grid is vulnerable to attacks on its cyber infrastructure because they allow an attacker to remotely manipulate various physical assets (e.g., generation, transmission, distribution, and substation equipment). For example, the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system of the Ukraine power grid was compromised by the BlackEnergy3 trojan, which launches a Distributed Denial-of-service (DDoS), espionage, and information erasure attack, [1] . First, the attackers sent spear-phishing emails with Microsoft Word and Excel documents infected with the BlackEnergy3 trojan to the employees of the Ukraine power grid company. Second, when these attachments were opened, the trojan self-installed and automatically discovered authentication credentials of the SCADA computers. Third, the discovered authentication credentials were used to create a virtual private network channel to remotely access the human-machine interface of the SCADA system and open circuit breakers, which led to power supply disruptions for over 225,000 end-users [2] . To prevent such attacks, power grid operators attempt to isolate the SCADA network from external interfaces and public networks [3] . Even if successful, this isolation cannot cope with demand-side cyberattacks that compromise and exploit residential and commercial high-wattage appliances. These appliances are not directly observed by power grid operators and are vulnerable to cyberattacks due to the poor security hygiene of end-users [4] or backdoors in their complex supply chains, involving foreign manufacturers [5] . Demand-side cyberattacks are possible because many highwattage appliances have communication and control interfaces forming an Internet of Things (IoT). Although such power grid attacks have not been executed in practice, similar attacks have been observed in other sectors. For instance, consider the Mirai malware that infected over 600,000 IoT devices [6] . The Mirai malware identified and accessed IoT devices with factory-set default authentication credentials and formed a network of bots (botnet). This botnet was used to launch a massive DDoS cyberattack on the Dyn Domain Name Service provider. The attack caused hours-long service disruptions to such web-services as Airbnb, PayPal, and Twitter [6] . As a result of this attack, Dyn lost roughly 8% of its customers [7] .
Recent studies [8] - [10] model generic demand-side cyberattacks on the power grid. Soltan et al. [8] demonstrated that the IoT-controlled Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) loads can cause generator and line failures, leading to local outages and system-wide blackouts, even if a small fraction of all loads is compromised (e.g., 4 bots per 1 MW of demand, where 1 bot is considered as 1 IoT-controlled HVAC unit). Additionally, results in [8] illustrated that the compromised loads can increase the operating cost (e.g., 50 bots per 1 MW demand can increase the power grid operating cost by 20%). Amini et al. [9] used load-altering demand-side attacks to cause power grid frequency instability over multiple periods aided by real-time frequency feedback. As [9] shows, multi-period attacks require a smaller number of compromised loads, relative to the single-period attacks [9] . Dvorkin and Garg [10] demonstrated propagation of demand-side cyber attacks from the distribution network to the transmission network, which scales attack impacts across large geographical areas. However, [8] - [10] consider generic appliances and do not consider specific attack vectors caused by a particular highwattage, IoT-enabled appliance. Furthermore, these studies use generic power grid test beds customized for the needs of their case studies. These assumptions lead to a conservative assessment of impacts that demand-side cyberattacks have on the power grid, which can be launched by a perfectly omniscient attacker. In practice, the attacker has limited knowledge of the power grid and the compromised loads, which reduces the attack severity. This paper aims to avoid unrealistic generalizations on the attack vector and, therefore, collects and exploits publicly accessible power grid and electric vehicle charging station (EVCS) demand data.
Our review shows that charging patterns of high-wattage Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEVs) in public EVCSs are reported through smartphone applications (e.g., ChargePoint). Although attempts were made to develop cyber hygiene requirements and protocols for PEVs charging (e.g., the 2017 report by European Network for Cyber Security [11] ), there is no established consensus among manufacturers, consumer advocates, utilities, as well as national and international authorities. For instance, power utilities in New York proposed a cybersecurity protocol, which was subsequently denied by the third-party service providers due to its engineering and cost implications [12] . Most of the utilities still treat PEVs and EVCSs as passive loads and do not pro-actively monitor their usage and cyber hygiene. As a result, the cybersecurity community warns that PEVs and EVCSs can evolve as an attack vector into the power grid. For instance, Kaspersky Lab revealed security flaws in the ChargePoint Home charger and its smartphone application [13] . This flaw would enable an attacker to remotely control PEV charging after gaining access to a Wi-Fi network 1 to which the charger is connected. Fraiji et al. [15] , Ahmed et al. [16] , and Pratt and Carroll [17] discuss cyber vulnerabilities of communication interfaces of IoT-controlled PEVs and EVCSs. The vulnerabilities in [13] , [15] - [17] are considered from the viewpoint of an attack damaging either PEVs or EVCSs. However, threats imposed on the power grid from such vulnerabilities are not assessed.
This paper aims to demonstrate that public information on EVCS demand and power grids is a cyber threat to the urban power grid with a large PEV fleet. The study appraises the risk of realistic rather than omniscient attack assumptions by only using public data to represent EVCS demand and power grid operations to design the attack. First, the study outlines how an attacker can collect data on PEVs and the power grid using public sources from Manhattan, NY as an example. Second, using this data the study designs a novel data-driven attack strategy that manipulates PEV and EVCS loads to induce frequency instability in the power grid. The novelty of this data-driven strategy is that it uses the state-feedback based partial eigenvalue relocation using the Bass-Gura approach, which makes it possible to relocate some eigenvalues to the location chosen by the attacker and to minimize the amount of the compromised EVCS demand needed for the attack. Unlike real-time frequency measurement and feedback in prior attack designs, e.g., as in [9] , the attack strategy in this work does not require real-time monitoring of the state of the power grid, i.e., can be carried out remotely, and is robust to the ambiguity in estimating the EVCS demand.
Given these public data and data-driven attack strategy, this paper evaluates the vulnerability of power grids to unsophisticated attack mechanisms that can be executed by malicious actors with moderate preparation and limited or even no access to power grid's cyber infrastructure. Such dilettante vulnerability assessments are not common in power grid security analyses, which typically employ the worst-case attack assumption, but common in other disciplines. For example, the N th Country Experiment carried out by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 1960-s aimed to assess the ability of non-military personnel to design a military-grade nuclear explosive device using publicly available publications and materials. The team of three physicists managed to design such a device ('dirty bomb') within 2 years, which had longterm implications for nuclear nonproliferation [18] . Similarly, we anticipate that this paper will raise awareness about the 1 For instance, bruteforcing is the most used method to hack passwords [14] . simplicity of designing and executing data-driven, demandside cyber attacks and facilitate negotiating a common cybersecurity protocol [12] , for grid-end appliances.
II. PUBLIC EVCS AND POWER GRID DATA
This section describes cyber-physical interfaces among the power grid, EVCSs, and PEVs and details a procedure to collect public data that the attacker can use to plan and launch an attack. Since the borough of Manhattan, NY has the greatest penetration rate of PEVs in the state of New York [19] , we considered this area to demonstrate the attack concept.
A. Interdependence between the Power Grid and PEVs Fig. 1 shows the cyber and physical links between the power grid, the EVCSs, and the PEVs. An EVCS is pivotal to the cyber-physical interdependency between the power grid and PEVs. The attacker can observe some of these interdependencies using web-services of the EVCS vendors and the thirdparties like ChargePoint that aggregate EVCS and PEV data.
There are three EVCS levels adopted by vendors and related organizations: Level 1 (L1), Level 2 (L2), and Level 3 (L3). They vary in their power capacity, voltage, and current ratings [20] . The L1 EVCS are wall outlets in a residential singlephase AC system rated at 120 V, 12-16 A, and deliver 1.44-1.9 kW power to the PEVs from the grid. Since L1 chargers are typically installed in homes, their data is not generally available to the public. The L2 and L3 chargers are in commercial charging stations that can host multiple PEVs. The L2 EVCS uses single or split-phase AC system with 208-240 V, 15-80 A, and delivers 3.1-19.2 kW power to PEVs from the grid. The L2 EVCS charges PEVs faster than the L1 EVCS. The L3 EVCS is the most high-wattage PEV charger and, therefore, induce a greater volatility to power grid operations. These superchargers are DC systems with 300-600 V, up to 400 A, and deliver 25-350 kW to each PEV. A wired communication channel between an EVCS and a PEV is used for transmitting the signal to condition and control the PEV charging. EVCSs and PEVs also have wireless channels that routes to smartphone applications and public web-sites.
B. Acquisition of Publicly Accessible Data 1) EVCS Data:
To acquire publicly available granular information on the physical location, electrical characteristics, historical and real-time usage of EVCSs, we use the ChargePoint smartphone application. This application aggregates 319 L2 and L3 EVCSs operated by different companies across Manhattan, NY, as of March 2019, as shown in Fig. 2 . Also, Alternative Fuels Data Center (AFDC) provides information about the location and business hours of EVCSs located in the US and Canada [21] . Cross-verifying the information provided by ChargePoint and AFDC, we obtained information about locations, physical characteristics, real-time and historical hourly usage profile of EVCSs as summarized in Fig. 3 . Each L2 charger in Fig. 3 has a power rating of 6.6 kW, while the power ratings of L3 chargers are 25 and 72 kW (72 kW for Tesla superchargers). Fig. 4 displays the total average hourly power consumed by the EVCS of each type and their standard deviation.
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G r e e n l o t s O t h e r s S e m a C h a r g e T e s l a 2) Power grid data: Unlike the EVCS data, which is available via third parties and dedicated aggregators, power grid data is fragmented. Therefore, an attacker has to manually review a vast number of documents from multiple public sources to reconstruct the grid topology and model the physical and electrical characteristics of the components. In addition to the high-level locational information about power grids available through Geographical Information System (e.g., Google Maps), one can refine this representation of the network using publicly reported updates on individual projects performed by the power utilities, which provide information about the locations of substations, transmission lines and power plants, and specific parameters (e.g., power and voltage ratings of lines and substations and historical and real-time behavior of generation and demand) [22] , [23] . Compiling and using this information, we were able to reconstruct a 345 kV and 138 kV transmission network configuration with substation transformers, lines, power plants, and a high-level aggregation of nodal demand in Manhattan, NY. This information is shown atop EVCS location map in Fig. 3 . The remaining power grid parameters that the attacker needs to launch a demandside attack are not readily available, but can be inferred from mandatory IEEE and IEC standards.
Using the representation in Fig. 3 , we design an electric circuit equivalent given in Fig. 5 , suitable for grid stability analysis. Table I summarizes the sources of power grid data and methods to obtain the grid parameters. The only large power plant (nominal capacity of 716 MW) is in node B5. We model other substations as either generators or loads based on their power injection (e.g., tie lines) or consumption. The demand data for the New York City is reported by New York Independent System Operator (NYISO). We itemize this demand for each node in Fig. 5 using load distribution from [27] . The power flows in tie-lines connecting the Manhattan network to the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) Interconnection and to the rest of the NYISO system are learned from the values released in the real-time dashboard of the system operators and the utilities [28] . Impedance of the underground transmission line cables are computed using Carsons equations [29] and the cable parameters in [30] . We approximated the voltage ratio of substation transformers based on the voltage level of the cables and the generating stations. Similarly, MVAratings of substations are approximated based on the associated generation and load. We approximated other parameters such as the transformer impedance ratio and the moment of inertia of the power plant using data sheets for equipment with comparable parameters [24] , [25] .
III. POWER GRID MODEL
Assuming that the attacker has the publicly accessible EVCS and the power grid data from Section II, designing an attack strategy requires a power grid model that relates the data with the physics of the power grid operation. Malicious load alterations are anticipated to be small, relative to the total system demand, and swift so as not to alarm the system operator. The impact of these small disturbances on the power grid stability can be analyzed using the small-signal stability theory [26] . The core assumption that underlies this theory is that small disturbances and the dynamic behavior of the power grid can be accurately modeled by linear power flow equations (e.g., DC approximation) and by first-order ordinary differential equations (e.g., swing equation). Taken together, the data collected and the small-signal power grid model allow the attacker to seek a data-driven, load-altering action that would cause frequency instability in power grids.
A. Model
We consider a power grid with N nodes with mutually exclusive subsets 2 of generator nodes G ⊆ N and load nodes L ⊆ N . Let N = card(N ) be the number of nodes such that N = 1 + G + L, which includes one slack (reference) bus, G = card(G), and L = card(L)
Using the DC power flow approximation, we model the nodal power balance for generator and load nodes as:
where Y ik and Y jk are the imaginary parts of the complex admittance between nodes i and k and nodes j and k, respectively. Further, ∆δ i and ∆δ j in Eq. (1) are defined as:
In addition to the DC power flow model in Eq. (1), we model the dynamic behavior of the power grid using the swing equation for every generator node i ∈ G:
where M i and D G i are the moment of inertia and damping coefficient of the generator at node i, ω i is the angular speed difference between the speed of the rotor of the generator at node i and the synchronous speed (ω s ). P G i is the electrical power output and P M i is the mechanical power output of its turbine driving the generator at node i.
The balance between P G = i∈G P
G i
and P L = j∈L P L j determines the frequency stability of the power grid. The conventional controllable generators are set to maintain P G ≈ P L by adjusting P M i using in-feed of ω i in realtime. This control is implemented using primary speed-droop (proportional) and secondary (integral) controls as:
where K P i and K I i are pre-defined proportional and integral gain parameters, respectively, and the negative sign on the right-hand side of Eq. (2c) indicates that P M i is adjusted in 2 If a node hosts both the generator and load it can be split into two nodes. 
The model in Eq. (3) can be built by the attacker using public data described in Section II. The manipulated EVCS demand data is accounted by parameter ∆P L i , while power grid parameters 
with the descriptor matrix E ∈ R (2G+L)×(2G+L) , state matix A ∈ R (2G+L)×(2G+L) , control vectorB ∈ R (2G+L)×1 and state variable vector x ∈ R (2G+L)×1 , as well as scalar input u ∈ R. The descriptor system in Eq. (4a) is regularized as:
where A = E −1Â and B = E −1B . In terms of Eq. (3), state vector x and control input vector u are defined as:
, j is the attack launching node. In turn, matrices A and B are defined as:
where 
is the vector of gains set by the attacker to modify the power consumption of the compromised loads. Hence, the system in Eq. (4b) is recast as follows:
which corresponds to the state-feedback based control diagram in Fig. 6 . The stability of the system in Eq. (5a) is determined by eigenvalues of matrix (A − BK a ) and, thus, can be influenced by the attacker by strategically selecting the values of K a . In turn, the attacker is limited in their ability to select the value of K a by the EVCS demand available for manipulations:
where ∆P max is the capacity of compromised EVCS loads. The attack shown in Fig. 6 is different from the attack in [8] - [10] . Particularly, the attack does not use real-time frequency feedback as in [9] and the attack is constrained by the real-life data available to the attacker as opposed to generalization of attack vector data in [8] - [10] . The attack in Eq. (5) simplifies implementation as the attacker does not need to observe the power grid in real-time. From the perspective of the attacker, Eq. (5) is constrained by the availability of data and the capacity of the compromised EVCSs demand ∆P max . Even if the parameters in the power grid model change over time, i.e., it affects matrix A, and, thus, power grid stability, the attacker can be informed of this change via a public disclosure process of power utilities (e.g., announcement about outages, maintenance, planned asset retirement/installations, upgrades, real-time generation and demand schedules).
2) Data-Driven Attack Optimization: Although the attacker can modify the eigenvalues of the power grid model to cause instability [9] , this relocation might be tracked by the grid operator. Thus, the relocation must be carried out in such a way that load alterations are kept at minimum. The attacker will aim to minimize K a to avoid being detected. Since the value of K a should be large enough to cause instability (e.g., to make the real part of at least one eigenvalue greater than or equal to zero), the attacker faces an optimization problem of selecting the least-possible value of K a that ensures instability. To do this, we use the Bass-Gura approach for the state-feedbackbased partial eigenvalue placement [31] .
Let o(s) and p(s) be the monic characteristic equations of the original (pre-attack) and compromised power grid models in Eqs. (4b) and (5a), respectively. We obtain the eigenvalues by solving:
where n = 2G + L is the order of the system and e o ∈ C n×1 and e p ∈ C n×1 are eigenvectors for Eqs. (6)- (7). We assume that the original power grid model is stable, i.e., Re(e o ) < 0. Adjusting K a the attacker modifies eigenvalues in e o such that some eigenvalues in e p become real positive. Using the statefeedback based controller design procedure presented in [31] , [32] , the relationship between the coefficients of Eq. (6) and those of Eq. (7) in terms of K a is:
where
are vectors of coefficients of the characteristic equations, W ∈ R n×n is a Hankel matrix with its first column set to [o 1 o 2 . . . o n−1 1] and elements below the anti-diagonal are zero, and M c ∈ R n×n is a controllability matrix defined as:
where rank(M c ) defines the maximum number of eigenvalues that can be relocated. Since matrix M c is composed of matrices A and B, its rank and the number of eigenvalues that can be relocated depends on parameters
I , and D L , which can be learned by the attacker using public sources. Recasting p(s) in Eq. (7) in the decomposed polynomial form in terms of eigenvalues leads to [32] :
where m is the number of eigenvalues that the attacker attempts to relocate, e a ⊆ e p is the vector of eigenvalues relocated by the attacker and e r ⊆ e p is the vector of the remaining eigenvalues. Vectors a = [a 0 a 1 . . . a m−1 ] and r = [r 0 r 1 . . . r n−m−1 ] are coefficients of monic polynomials formed by e a and e r , respectively. Given e a , we use Eqs. (8)- (10) to compute r [32] :
where F ∈ C n−m+1×n and g ∈ C n−m+1×1 are the auxiliary matrix and vector defined as in Eqs. (12a)-(12f) below. Indeed, since the matrices M c and W are derived from matrices A and B, the auxiliary terms are parameterized as:
Back substituting r(s) in Eq. (10) yields m linearly independent equations that can be expressed as follows:
where matrix V ∈ C m×n and vector h ∈ C m×1 , which assures e a ⊆ e p as desired by the attacker assuming full state-feedback controllability of the model in Eq. (5a). Since Eq. (13) governs the eigenvalue relocation, the attacker can use the following optimization problem to select the least possible value of K a :
3) Parameter Uncertainty in the Data-Driven Attack: To account for the likelihood of erroneous data, the attacker may robustify the data-driven attack optimized in Eq. (14) against inaccuracies of the model parameters it learns. Randomness in ∆P L max can be modeled as ∆P L ( ) = ∆P L max + , where is the model parameter uncertainty or inaccuracy (e.g., Gaussian noise). Thus, Eq. (14c) is replaced with the following probabilistic constraint:
where η is a small number chosen by the attacker based on their confidence in the data. Eq. (15) can be reformulated as a second-order conic constraint [33] :
where α = φ −1 (1 − η)Stdev( ) is an error margin on estimating ∆P L max and φ −1 is an inverse cumulative distribution function of the standard Gaussian distribution.
IV. CASE STUDY
We evaluate the feasibility of the data-driven attack developed above using the EVCS demand and power grid data illustrated in Fig. 3 . The expected value and standard deviation of the EVCS demand is used as in Fig. 4 with η = 0.0005. We set node B7, connecting Manhattan, NY with New Jersey (see Fig. 3 ), as the reference node with an infinite power source since it is the largest power supplier to Manhattan, NY. The base power is 100 MVA and the rated system frequency is 60 Hz. The values of state vector x in the optimization problem in Eq. (14) are conservatively obtained by solving Eq. (4b) for normal operating conditions. The case study uses the opensource CVX package run under MATLAB and is carried out on a MacBook Air with a 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 8 GB RAM. The optimization in Eq. (14) is convex and, hence, does not pose a computational challenge, even if applied to larger networks than in Fig. 3 . All instances below were solved under tens of seconds.
A. Ability of the Attacker to Relocate Eigenvalues
The objective of this subsection is to demonstrate that the attacker can leverage the optimization in Eq. (14) to move eigenvalues of the pre-attack system to pre-determined locations in the real-positive plane, thus causing system instability. The power grid in Fig. 5 has 4 generation nodes (including reference node B7) represented by (ω i , δ i ), and 4 load nodes represented by θ j . Thus, state vector x has 12 entries (2 entries per generation node and 1 entry per load node) and the preattack power grid modeled by Eq. (4b) has 12 eigenvalues. We select node B4 to attack because it has the greatest demand. Using Eq. (9), we compute controllability matrix M c and find that rank(M c ) = 2, which means that the attacker can attempt to move up to 2 eigenvalues. Since the objective of the attacker is to move these eigenvalues to the real-positive plane to destabilize the power grid, the target eigenvalue locations are arbitrarily set to e a = a ± jb = 0.5 ± j5 for the demonstration as shown in Fig. 7 . These eigenvalues corresponds to the damping ratio ξ = −10% and the natural oscillation frequency ω n = 5 rad/s (since a = −ξω n and b = ω n 1 − ξ 2 [26] ). Upon relocating 2 eigenvalues to the target locations in the real-positive plane, 2 out of 12 state variables will oscillate following the attack with angular frequency ω n and an increasing amplitude (due to negative damping −ξ), causing power grid instability. Under the attack scenario described above, the current maximum EVCS demand given by the maximum daily peak of ≈600 kW and standard deviation of 211 kW (both are observed at 14:00, see Fig. 4 ) is not sufficient to relocate any eigenvalue to the target locations and, therefore, Eq. (14) yields an infeasible solution. Therefore, the EVCS demand at node B4 is scaled up to the maximum daily peak of 355 MW 3 and standard deviation of 124 MW to simulate a higher PEV penetration case. In this case, two eigenvalues are moved into the real-positive plane as shown in Fig. 7 , which causes power grid instability targeted by the attacker.
B. Minimum EVCS Demand to Destabilize the Power Grid
In the previous subsection, we demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed data-driven attack for the case with a relatively high, but foreseeable penetration rate of PEVs. However, 3 Equivalent to ≈2,900 Model S Teslas simultaneously charged by 120 kW superchargers. The number reduces to ≈1000 PEVs, if 350 kW Ionity highpower chargers are used instead. this demonstration used arbitrarily chosen target eigenvalue locations. In practice, it is anticipated that such a relocation of eigenvalues can be detected by the power grid operator and, therefore, the attacker is likely to mask its intention and relocate eigenvalues surreptitiously. Under this scenario, the attacker may elect to move eigenvalues to a so-called region of vulnerability, where endogenous disturbances natural to power grid operations can cause power grid instability. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation defines the region of vulnerability as, [34] :
Using the region of vulnerability in Eq. (17), we will compute the minimum EVCS demand that the attacker needs to compromise to move 2 eigenvalues into that region of vulnerability. We discretize S a using a resolution of 0.3% and 0.1 rad/s intervals for ξ and ω n , respectively, and obtain the discrete spaceŜ a . For each pair {ξ,ω n } ∈Ŝ a , we compute target eigenvalues asê a =â ± jb, whereâ = −ξω n andb = ω n 1 −ξ 2 . In addition to the selection of target eigenvalueŝ e a that the attacker seeks to achieve, the amount of EVCS loads that the attacker needs to compromise in order to launch an attack depends on pre-attack eigenvalues e o and rank(M c ). Since rank(M c ) < card(x), the attacker can directly impact 4 only some state variables in x. As a result, the attacker cannot always relocate eigenvalues to the chosen target locations precisely. Therefore, for each pair {ξ,ω n } ∈Ŝ a , we obtain the value ofK a using the optimization in Eq. (14) and obtain the minimum EVCS load (∆P L =K a x) that needs to be compromised to destabilize the power grid. To assess how precisely the attacker managed to relocate eigenvalues to the target locations, we use distance metric ε = ||ẽ p −ê a || 2 , where e p ⊆ e p is the vector of the 2 nearest eigenvalues toê a . This distance serves as a measure of remoteness between the actual position of the 2 nearest and target eigenvalues locations. Fig. 8 illustrates the ability of the attacker to relocate eigenvalues to the target locations precisely. The relocation accuracy improves, i.e., the value of ε → 0, as the values of ω n ∈Ŝ a andξ ∈Ŝ a increase. However, the value of ε is more sensitive toω n than toξ. The attack scenarios that use pairs {ξ,ω n } ∈Ŝ a with a relatively high accuracy of relocation (e.g., ε < 0.1, see Fig. 8 ) are used to compute ∆P L =K a x and are summarized in Table II . As the value of ξ and ω n increase, the minimum EVCS load required to launch an attack from node B4 reduces. In other words, the amount of EVCS loads needed to be compromised increases with the severity of instabilities, i.e., higher oscillations and negative damping of the time-domain response of state variables x.
This analysis assumes that the data-driven attack is launched from node B4. If this case study is carried out for other nodes, the severity of the attack reduces. For example, if the attack is launched by nodes B3, B5, and B6, it will not destabilize the power grid as their load is not enough to move the eigenvalues, with smaller amount of ε, into the region of vulnerability.
V. CONCLUSION This paper unveils a demand-side cyberattack that can imperil the power grid operations using PEVs and EVCS infrastructure. The attack uses publicly available EVCS and power grid data to design a data-driven attack strategy that is capable of destabilizing the power grid using partial eigenvalue relocation. Using data-driven optimization, we study the impact of this attack on the power grid of Manhattan, NY. Even though the current PEV penetration does not seem feasible to hamper the power grid stability, it highlights an emerging vulnerability as more PEVs are rolled out, which drives the need for high-capacity EVCSs and leads to more PEVs charged simultaneously. REFERENCES
